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Abstract
Background: Adequate hospital staffing during and after a disaster is critical to meet increased health care demands
and to ensure continuity of care and patient safety. However, when a disaster occurs, staff may become both victim
and responder, decreasing their ability and willingness to report for work. This qualitative study assessed the personal
and professional challenges that affected staff decisions to report to work following a natural disaster and examined
the role of management in addressing staff needs and concerns.
Methods: Semi-structured interviews were conducted with individuals who filled key management roles in the United
States Department of Veterans Affairs New York Harbor Healthcare System’s response to Superstorm Sandy and during
the facility’s initial recovery phase. All interviews were audio recorded and transcribed. Three major themes were
identified: 1) Barriers to reporting (“Barriers”), 2) Facilitators to reporting (“Facilitators”), and 3) Responses to staff
needs and concerns (“Responses”). Atlas.ti 7.1.6 software program was used for the management and analysis of
the transcripts.
Results: Results indicated that staff encountered several barriers that impeded their ability to report to work at
mobile vans at the temporarily nonoperational Manhattan campus or at two other VA facilities in Brooklyn and
the Bronx in the initial post-Sandy period including transportation problems, personal property damage, and
communication issues. In addition, we found evidence of facilitators to reporting as expressed through descriptions of
professional duty. Our findings also revealed that management was aware of the challenges that staff was facing and
made efforts to reduce barriers and accommodate staff affected by the storm.
Conclusions: During and after a disaster event, hospital staff is often confronted with challenges that affect decisions
to report for work and perform effectively under potentially harsh conditions. This study examined barriers and
facilitators that hospital staff encountered following a major natural disaster from the management perspective.
Insights gained from this study can be used to inform future disaster planning and preparedness efforts, and help
ensure that there is adequate staffing to mount an effective response when a disaster occurs, and to recover
from its aftermath.
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Background
Public health emergencies and disasters place an enor-
mous strain on health care systems and have the poten-
tial to disrupt the delivery of health services and
compromise patient care. Having adequate staffing dur-
ing and after a disaster is critical to hospital surge cap-
acity, i.e., a hospital’s ability to “expand quickly beyond
normal services” to meet increased health care de-
mands [1], and to ensure continuity of care and patient
safety [2–5]. However, a comprehensive review of more
than 30 years of literature on emergency health care
workers’ responses to emergencies and disasters sug-
gests that it is unrealistic to assume that all health care
workers will report to work during or shortly after an
event [6]. When disasters occur, staff may become both
victims and responders, thus complicating their deci-
sions regarding whether to report for duty. As a result,
it is important to identify factors that affect reporting
decisions in order to ensure there is adequate staffing
to mount an effective response and meet the surge in
demand.
Qureshi and colleagues distinguish between two con-
cepts that affect decisions to respond to work during a
disaster: ability to respond and willingness to respond
[7]. ‘Ability’ refers to one’s capacity to report (i.e., is
available and has the means to report) whereas ‘willing-
ness’ refers to a personal choice to report [3, 7, 8]. Al-
though the two concepts are similar, Qureshi and
colleagues [7] point out “even if one is fully able, he or
she might still not be willing to report to work.” Con-
versely, one may be willing, but lack the ability to report
to work. Previous research has shown that hospital staff
is often confronted with multiple barriers that impact
their ability and willingness to report to work following
a disaster [3, 7]. Typical barriers that affect the ability to
report during a disaster include transportation problems
and obligations to care for children, elders, pets, and
other dependents [3, 6, 7, 9, 10]. In terms of willing-
ness, fear and concern for self, family, and pets, as well
as personal health problems have been reported as bar-
riers [3, 7, 9, 11]. Additional factors shown to influence
decisions to report include perceived emergency pre-
paredness of the organization, perceived importance of
one’s role during a disaster, and the strength of an indi-
vidual’s sense of professional duty [11–16]. In addition,
prior experience with disasters has been shown to influ-
ence hospital evacuation and disaster response deci-
sions [14, 17].
Although there is substantial literature on decisions to
report to work during a disaster, the majority of studies
have been based on quantitative data drawn from hypo-
thetical/scenario-based surveys to examine staff ability
and willingness [3, 7, 10, 12, 18], which may not repre-
sent actual decisions made during a disaster event.
Qualitative studies may allow for a more detailed de-
scription of staff needs and concerns during a disaster;
however, most studies have focused on the employee
perspective to identify factors associated with decisions
to report [9, 11, 14]. To our knowledge, previous work
has not examined the role of executive and middle man-
agement decision makers in identifying and reducing
barriers to reporting. Research describing the manage-
ment perspective could inform the development of more
effective strategies to address staff needs and concerns
in advance, which may reduce barriers to reporting, and
thus, mitigate the potential adverse impact of staff short-
ages on patient care [14]. In this study, we examine the
impact of personal and professional challenges on staff
response and recovery efforts, using qualitative data
from interviews with individuals who filled key manage-
ment roles in the United States Department of Veterans
Affairs (VA) during Superstorm Sandy (“Sandy”) - the
most devastating natural disaster ever to hit NYC and
the second-costliest hurricane in U.S. history - which
made landfall on the New York/New Jersey area on
October 29, 2012 [19–21].
Massive flooding across Lower Manhattan led to
the closure of five acute care hospitals, including the
Manhattan campus of the VA New York Harbor Health-
care System (NYHHS). VA NYHHS chose to evacuate its
Manhattan VA Medical Center (VAMC) in advance of the
storm rather than shelter-in-place, transferring patients to
neighboring VA facilities or discharging some to the com-
munity. Due to extensive flood damage, the Manhattan fa-
cility remained closed for a few months post-Sandy.
During this time, Manhattan VAMC staff reported to VA
Brooklyn and Bronx facilities.
Methods
Participants and sampling
For exploratory purposes, a qualitative approach using
semi-structured interviews was chosen. Interviews were
conducted 12 weeks post-Sandy with staff from the
Manhattan campus of the VA NYHHS and from VA
New York/New Jersey Veterans Integrated Service Net-
work 3 (VISN 3), the regional network that includes
NYHHS, who participated in disaster response efforts.
Potential interview respondents were identified through
existing contacts in VA at local, regional and national
levels, and through VA documents (e.g., After Action
Reports (AARs), NYHHS online directory). Stratified
purposive sampling techniques were used to select indi-
viduals who had filled key roles in NYHHS’s response to
Sandy. The analytic sample consists of 32 participants,
including senior leaders (executive managers and clini-
cians in senior administrative roles), clinical decision
makers (nurses, physicians, and social workers), and in-
dividuals from emergency management, transport, and
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support services (e.g., food, laundry). Oral consent was
obtained from respondents to be both interviewed and
recorded. Respondents could decline to be interviewed,
end the interview at any point, or participate in an inter-
view but not be recorded in whole or part. The VA
Greater Los Angeles Healthcare System’s Institutional
Review Board (IRB) approved the study protocol.
Data collection
Interviews were conducted by at least two members of the
research team and lasted 60–90 min. The interview guide
was developed based on an instrument used in a prior
study on VA nursing home evacuations after Hurri-
canes Katrina and Rita [22], a hospital evacuation tool
by Schultz and colleagues [23], and the hospital evacu-
ation literature [24–27]. Interview respondents were
asked about successes, challenges, and lessons learned.
Data analysis
All interviews were audio recorded and transcribed ver-
batim. The Atlas.ti 7.1.6 software program was used for
the management and analysis of the transcripts. Two
members of the project team (KR and AG) read the
transcripts and highlighted sections of text using prelim-
inary codes based on the interview guide and hospital
evacuation literature. This process resulted in the identi-
fication of 55 quotes related to the impact of Sandy on
hospital staff. An additional project team member (AM)
then conducted a pile sorting exercise to identify major
themes among the quotes. Three theme definitions were
developed from the exercise: 1) Barriers to reporting
(“Barriers”), 2) Facilitators to reporting (“Facilitators”),
and 3) Responses to staff needs and concerns (“Re-
sponses”). Theme definitions and the quotes were first
discussed with a separate team member (KH) and then
provided to an additional team member (AG), who con-
ducted an independent pile sort, reviewing the quotes
and assigning each one to one of the 3 a priori themes.
Agreement between the results of the pile sorting by these
two authors was estimated for each theme definition using
the Kappa statistic. Kappa for “Barriers” was found to be
.55, indicating moderate agreement; .69 for “Facilitators,”
indicating substantial agreement; and .84 for “Responses,”
indicating almost perfect agreement [28]. Disagreements
in coding were resolved through discussion.
Results
Respondents described several instances of personal and
professional challenges that impacted the ability and will-
ingness of staff to report to work during the first 3 months
following Sandy. Respondents in management positions
also described efforts to address staff needs and concerns
while balancing managerial responsibilities.
Barriers to reporting
Our findings showed that staff encountered several bar-
riers that impeded their ability to report to work. The
most commonly reported barrier was transportation
problems. In the aftermath of the storm, much of Lower
Manhattan remained under water, major roadways were
closed, and the public transit system effectively shut
down. Moreover, the Manhattan VA facility was itself
flooded and mostly nonoperational at the time the inter-
views for this study were conducted. Although some
staff reported to work at mobile vans at the temporarily
closed campus, most staff reported to work at one of
two other VA facilities in Brooklyn and the Bronx. As a
result, many staff members faced difficulties getting to
work for the first several days following Sandy. One re-
spondent stated, “I was completely crippled for several
days myself, I had no way to get anywhere, once Man-
hattan went down, there was no public transportation; I
didn’t have a vehicle.” Although transportation condi-
tions gradually improved in the weeks following Sandy,
several respondents commented on the impact that
transportation issues had on staffing during initial re-
sponse efforts. As a key NYHHS decision-maker stated:
“There was no public transportation. They [staff man-
agers] had a very hard time.... They had no staffing. They
couldn’t get staff in here.”
In addition to transportation barriers, our findings
suggest that personal property damage or loss contrib-
uted to staffing issues. According to several comments,
there were a number of staff that was unable to come to
work because their “homes were wiped out.” A NYHHS
Emergency Manager received notification from one of
the medical centers that, “…they were facing huge staff
shortages for two reasons, one is that I’ve lost my house
and I’m not coming to work, and secondly, I didn’t lose
my house, but I can’t get to work.”
Several respondents also noted that communication is-
sues posed a challenge to reporting after the storm. The
day before Sandy struck, one respondent described sending
email messages and announcements to staff alerting them
to the Manhattan VAMC evacuation and closure in antici-
pation of the storm. However, Sandy caused widespread
power outages that lasted several days, and in some areas
weeks, which hindered efforts to communicate with staff
after the storm and led to some confusion about where staff
was supposed to report. One senior leader described efforts
to communicate with staff during this time period: “…we
hoped that those who could communicate with each other
would get the messaging out that we needed, which was
that employees were to report to their nearest facility.”
Facilitators to reporting
Although respondents described several barriers to staff
reporting to work, we also found evidence of facilitators
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to reporting as expressed through descriptions of profes-
sional duty. For example, several respondents described
the overwhelming response by staff who wanted to help
and reported for duty “despite their own personal hard-
ships.” While describing some of the challenges that staff
was dealing with, one senior leader shared:
There were so many stories floating around. There
was one person who couldn’t find her parents for a
long time, but she was here. There was another story
about a nursing assistant saying, “All the clothes I
own, I’m wearing,” but he was here. You know, there
were people who just make your left ventricle swell,
they were just unbelievable. Not that everybody was
terrific and not that there weren’t people, ‘I can’t
believe I have to come all the way over here,’ but
most people really understood, these are our
veterans and we’re taking care of them.
Our findings suggest that a strong sense of duty was
an important factor in the decision to report to work.
However, it was also evident that personal circum-
stances and concerns played a role in the decision
process, with several comments speaking to challenges
balancing personal and professional obligations. For ex-
ample, one senior leader shared, “…a lot of the staff are
victims, too, in this and so they’re trying to manage
multiple responsibilities and priorities,” with the top
priority being the health and safety of their own fam-
ilies. Another respondent described the dilemma faced
by emergency management staff when deciding
whether or not to report to work: “When do you leave
your own place and say ‘I should come in’ or say ‘well,
my house is going to flood and I’ve got to watch my
kids, so what do I do?’”
Management responses to staff needs and concerns
Our findings showed that management readily acknowl-
edged the personal challenges that staff was dealing with
and made efforts to accommodate staff impacted by the
storm. For example, one clinical decision maker stated:
“…we had a lot of staff that got hit very hard. They lost
their homes, they lost their car, and they had no place to
live. You see them. You ask them what’s going on. Any
information you can give them, you give it to them. You
make them feel as though you care about them as
people, not just as workers.” Another respondent de-
scribed efforts to obtain leave time for staff who were
directly impacted by the storm: “we really pushed hard
where we could for getting people time off, getting au-
thorized absence for people who were in situations that
really they were genuinely crippled…”
In addition, leadership at both the NYHHS level and
the VISN level described instances where VA was able to
anticipate and address staff needs and concerns. For ex-
ample, post-Sandy, staff was instructed to report to the
closest facility. In recognition of the confusion this
would likely cause, a ‘welcoming center’ was set up at
every facility in order to assign staff a role. However,
comments from several respondents suggested that there
were also limitations to the support that management
could provide. When asked “what can the VA do” to as-
sist staff who were having a difficult time getting to
work, a senior leader replied: “…we’ve got authority to
move them from one location to the hospital, like if they
carpooled and went to a parking lot, we can pick them
up but you can’t pick them up at home and bring them
in. So there are some limits to what you can do.” Despite
these regulatory challenges, efforts were made to reduce
transportation barriers. For example, one senior leader de-
scribed putting in a shuttle bus system to help transport
staff members who were able to report to the Manhattan
campus over to the other VAMCs.
Although there were numerous descriptions of efforts
to help staff, respondents in management positions de-
scribed the challenge of trying to balance employee
needs and management responsibilities. For example,
while acknowledging the personal losses suffered by
some staff members, a senior leader expressed concern
about mounting an effective disaster response with fewer
staff, “We had a number of people… that… literally lost
everything and in the meanwhile, you have to kind of
cobble together a response.” With these issues in mind,
another respondent discussed the impact that employee
preparedness has on the ability of staff to report during
disaster response: “…if they don’t have daycare, they
don’t have all the family care plan things that we talk
about should be in place, they can’t come in.”
Discussion
The present study examined the challenges faced by
hospital staff following a major natural disaster from the
management perspective. Results suggest that there are
several factors that affect decisions to report for duty
during post-disaster response and early recovery efforts.
Our findings also indicated that management was aware
of the challenges that staff was dealing with and pro-
actively made efforts to provide assistance to staff when
possible. The ability to forecast challenges and address
barriers in advance may allow management to better
plan and prepare for predictable problems and increase
the likelihood of being able to ensure adequate staffing
to provide timely access to care following a natural dis-
aster [14].
This study is unusual in that it discusses issues regard-
ing reporting to work at facilities other than the facility
that was itself rendered temporarily nonoperational by
the disaster. Nevertheless, the findings are often similar
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to the findings of prior studies. For example, consistent
with previous research [3, 7, 12], our findings showed
that staff encountered several barriers following Sandy
including transportation problems and personal property
damage. Establishing a workforce readiness plan that in-
cludes provisions such as temporary housing and travel
assistance could serve to mitigate these barriers and in-
crease facilitators to reporting [29].
Our findings also showed that communication issues
served as a barrier to reporting to work. Communication
plays a critical role during disaster response in providing
emergency responders with pertinent information about
appropriate actions to take. However, during a disaster,
communication channels often fail, making it difficult to
transmit and receive information. As reported by several
respondents, insufficient information during and imme-
diately after Sandy led to confusion about when and
where staff was supposed to report for work. Simple
tools such as telephone notification cascades, provided
telephone or text service is available, can strengthen
communication capacity by providing staff with a proto-
col to be implemented in the event of a disaster.
Although mitigating barriers is important for increas-
ing staff ’s ability to report for work in a disaster, an in-
dividual must be both willing and able to respond in
order to ensure that there is adequate staffing to meet
pre-existing and increased demand for health services.
In the present study, we found evidence of staff willing-
ness to report as expressed through descriptions of pro-
fessional duty. Previous research suggests that decisions
to report to work are related to an individual’s sense of
professional duty and are positively influenced by a car-
ing connection with the organization [11, 14–16]. For
example, a qualitative study found that hospital staff
who perceived their organization as having a caring and
supportive culture was more willing to report during a
fire disaster [14]. In this study, this kind of connected-
ness was indicated by numerous reports of dedicated
staff members overcoming barriers and reporting to
work “despite personal hardships,” and through de-
scriptions of management’s efforts to reduce barriers
and support staff needs. Davidson and colleagues [14]
suggest that connectedness with an organization is
cultivated prior to the disaster and further defined by
leadership actions during a disaster or emergency.
There also is evidence to suggest that a supportive
organizational culture is strongly associated with em-
ployee satisfaction - with management practices and
leadership in the workplace identified as important
drivers of satisfaction [30, 31]. Therefore, efforts to im-
prove employee satisfaction and build resiliency may
strengthen one’s sense of professional duty and dedica-
tion to the organization, increasing the likelihood that
the employee will report to work.
Effective emergency preparedness is critical to mount-
ing a successful disaster response and for ensuring min-
imal disruptions to patient care. While workplace
preparedness is important for a successful response [11,
12], personal disaster preparedness planning is also ne-
cessary for ensuring staff readiness after a disaster [2].
Previous research suggests that when a disaster strikes,
staff may be confronted with competing personal and
professional duties [3, 14]. In line with this, several re-
spondents described the personal challenges that staff
was dealing with during the response and early recovery
period. Respondents also described their own challenges
with managing multiple responsibilities during this time.
Incorporating employee preparedness efforts into exist-
ing workplace preparedness practices, such as working
with employees to develop and maintain a personal dis-
aster plan, may help to reduce the tension between per-
sonal and professional responsibilities and facilitate
willingness to report [3, 9]. In addition, effective em-
ployee preparedness may also allow management to bet-
ter balance the needs of employees with management
responsibilities.
There are several limitations to this study. First, the
data were collected from a purposive sample. As a result,
the findings may not be reflective of VA management
views beyond the key leaders involved in this one disas-
ter. In addition, the data represent the experience of a
single facility within VA and the single region within
which that facility resides, thereby limiting the
generalizability of the findings to other facilities. It
should also be noted that study participants often pro-
vided third-person accounts of staff experiences, which
may not be reflective of the actual experiences of staff.
Although the results are in strong accordance with prior
research findings, the inclusion of additional frontline
staff in future work would allow researchers to assess
and compare disaster response decisions from multiple
perspectives. Finally, this study assessed management
perspectives of challenges faced by staff following a nat-
ural disaster. Given that response efforts and associated
challenges may differ depending on the type of event, fu-
ture work should investigate staff response efforts from
the management perspective for other types of disasters
and emergencies.
Conclusion
In the past decade, we have witnessed a dramatic in-
crease in the number and severity of weather-related di-
sasters [29]. The ability to meet increased demand for
health services during a disaster event requires having
available staff to meet those needs [2, 4]. However, when
a disaster occurs, staff may encounter personal and pro-
fessional challenges that decrease their ability and will-
ingness to respond. This study examined barriers and
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facilitators that hospital staff encountered following a
major natural disaster from the management perspec-
tive. Our findings suggest that proactively addressing
staff needs and concerns can help mitigate barriers,
strengthen professional duty, and increase willingness to
report. In addition, improving workplace and personal
preparedness efforts can help ensure that there is ad-
equate staffing to mount an effective response when a
disaster occurs.
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